This paper introduces the notion of objection-based causal networks. which resemble probabilistic causal networks ex cept that tht:>y are quant.ified using ob jections. An objection is a logical sen tence and denotes a condition under which a causal dependency does not exist. Objection-based causal net.works enjoy al most all the properties that make proba bilistic causal networks popular, with the added advantage that objections are, ar guably. more int.uitive than probabilities.
INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic causal networks (PCNs) [1. 11] have re rently become very popular in many practical do mains. such as medical diagnosis [8] . vision [10) . lan guage understanding [7] . and map learning [5) . A major difficulty in constructing these networks is pro viding prior and conditional probabilities that quan tify root nodes and causal dependencies. Most people find these probabilities overly detailed and counterin tuitive [6) . The work described in this paper attempts to overcome this difficulty by introducing the notion of objection-based causal networks (OCNs). Root nodes and causal dependencies in OCNs are quanti fied by providing objections rather than probabilities.
In PCNs. a causal dependency between nodes is quantified by providing a number in the interval [0.1]. For example. the depeudency from .4 = "Tlw grass is wet'' to B = "My shoes are wet" may be quantified by p = .�5. The number pis int.erpret .ed as a conditional probability of the effect B given the cause A. Condi tional probabilities are usually assessed by a domain expert or obtained from statistical data. However. most domain experts have difficulty assessing these probabilities and stat-istical data may not always be available [6. 1) .
In OCNs, a causal dependency between nodes is quantified hy providing a logical sentence under which tlw dependency does not exist. For example, the dependency from "The grass is wet" t.o "My shoes are wet" may be quantified by C = "I did not step on the grass." The sentence C is called an objec tion and plays the same role played by the number p given above. The semantics of objections is based on the notions of objection-based states of belief and objection-based conditionalization [4) , which are the counterpart. s of probabilistic states of belief and prob abilistic conditionalization, respectively.
One could state at least three factors that make PCNs so popular. First, PCNs allow the representation of non-binary beliefs, which is not . allowed by classical logic representations. Next, constructing a consistent PCN is much easier and more systematic than con structing a consistent classical logic theory. Finally, PCNs an• based on probability theory. which sup ports many patterns of plausible reasoning [11. 12) that. are not supported by classical logic.
OCNs enjoy all the above properties. Section 2 shows that an OCN can be interpreted as a state of belief that allows non-binary beliefs. Section 3 shows that constructing a consistent OCN is very similar to con structing a PCN. Finally. Section 4 shows how to compute a state of belief represented by an OCN, and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
OBJECTION-BASES STATES OF BELIEF
In probability calculus. we assess our ronfidence in a sentence by providing a number in the interval [U. 1).
If we have complete confidence in a sentence. we give it a probability of l; otherwise, we give it a probabil ity of less than one. . It rained or the sprinkler was on"' in its domain. Figure I and Table 2 From here on. I assum e that objections are sentences in a propositional language 0. I also assume that primitive propositions of the languages C and ('J are disjoint.
1 I assume that the support for a sent.ence does not determine that for its negat.ion. l1 i!< common. though.
to assume that the belief in a sentence determine!' that of its negation. I use the term �support � as opposed to �helief� to emphasize this difference.
OBJECTIONS
Thf> notion of objl'r l ion is cf'nt.ral iu objPction-based states of belief . In this SIO'ction. I discuss this notion and some related ones in more details. Let us consider an example. Suppose that the lan� guage C is defined over primitive propositions corre sponding to the nodes of Figure 1 . and suppose that. the language 0 is defined over the following primitive 
CONSISTENCY
Probability theory imposes three consistency condi tions on probabilistic states of belief. First. the prob ability of a tautology must be one. Second. the prob ability of a disjunction of logically disjoint sent.enres must be the sum of the probabilities of each of the dis juncts. Finally. equivalent sentences must have equal probabilit-ies. An objection-ba<oed state of belief ell has three corresponding conditions:
1. 4>(true) :: false:2 A tautology has a. contradic tory objection. These concepts enrich the language used to describe stat.es of belief.
�(A VB)=: �(A)
In probability calculus we t.alk about. a sentence being no more probable than another sentence. In objec tion calc ulus we talk about a sentence being no more objectionable than another.
Definition 3
Wt say that A z.� no mon ohj�:rtwn.ablt than B m statt <I> 2/ a1id only zf:
) I= �(B).
In probability calculus we say that a sentence is no mo re believed than another if and only if it is no more probable. In obj ection calculus. however. the relation between belief and objectionability is more involved. 
That is, whenever <I» admits A and -.A. it also admits B and -.B.
COMPONENTS OF A CAUSAL NETWORK
A quantified causal network has three components. One component is a directed graph such as the one depict-ed in Figure 1 . which is referred to a<J an un quantified causal network. 
PRlOR SUPPORTS
The first component of a causal network requires two degrees of support for each root node P;. One of these degrees represents the support for Pi and the other represents the support. for -,P;. For example, the ne-twork of Figure 1 requires four prior dPgr�>es of support , which are attributed to each of P1 = ·'It rained." . ..., pl = "It. did not. rain," P� = "The sprinkler wa"> on,·· and -,p2 = ''The sprinkler was off."
In PCNs. prior supports are probabilities and must satisfy the following consistency condition: P(P;) + P( -.Pi) = 1. Tables 2 depicts prior probabili ties for the network of Figure 1 .
In OCNs, prior supports are objections and must satisfy the following consist.ency condition: �( P,) A �(-.Pi) =:false. This condition ensures that P; and P(PJ) probabilistic quantification of the causal Figure 1 . The above prohabilit.it:>s and Figure 1 constitu te a probabilist . i<-causal network .
-.P; are not objected to simultaneously. Tables 3 de   picts prior objections for the network of Figure 1 . The second component of a causal network requires 2"+1 degrees of support for each node P; with n par ents. Half of these degrees are supports for P; and the other half belongs to -.P;. Each of these supports is conditioned on a conjunction over the parents of P;.
CONDITIONAL SUPPORTS
In PCNs. conditional degrees of support are condi tional probabilities and must. satisfy the following consistency condition: P(P;IA) + P(-.P;IA) = 1. Ta ble 2 depicts conditional probabilities for the network of Figure 1 . For example, the conditional probability of Ps = "My shoes are wet" given P3 = "The grass is wef' is . 9 .
In OCNs, conditional degrees of support are condi tional objections and must satisfy the following con sistency wndition: �A ( P;) 1\41.4 ( -.P;) =false. Here.
41 A ( P;) and 41.4 ( -.P;) are the condit.ional objections toP; and-.?,-. respectively. given .4. Table 3 depicts conditional objections for the network of Figure 1 .
For example . a conditional ob jection to P5 = "'My shoes are wet'' given P3 = "The grass is wet" is 04 I will now state a convention and an intuition about.
objection-based belief change. I will then present a conditionalization rule that is implied by the star.ed convention and intuition. First is the convention:
An accepted sentence remains accepted af t.er observing a non-rejected sentence.
By definition, a non-rej ected sentence does not con tradict any accepted sentence. The above convention says that none of the accepted sentences should be given up as a. result. of observing a non-rejected sen tence.
Following is the intuition about. changed objections:
The objection to a sent.ence B. after ob serving a non-rejected sentence A, is the initial objection to A /1. B minus the initial objection to A.. Similar to Bayes conditionalization, objection-ba.. <: ed conditionalization assumes that the observed sen tence A is not. reject.ed by �.
Objection-based conditionalization is an instance of abstract conditionalization [4] . which supports pat terns of plausible inference that make Bayes condi tionalization popular [12] . Table 3 : An objt>ction-basPd quantifi cation of the causalnet.work in Figure 1 . The above objections and Figure 1 coust . it.ut . e an ohjection-based causal network.
Objection-based pi"oduct rule
we have informa tion about a changed st. at. e of belief and we want to know more about. the old st.a.te. In probability calculus. this is achieved by using an im port.a.nt result. called the product rule. It stat.es that.
The restriction on the equation above results from the inability to condit.ionalize a probabili stic state of belief on a sentence with zero probability.
A corresponding result in objection calculus is
Not. e how logical disjunction is playing the role that is played by numeric multiplication in probability cal culus. Note also that we have more restrictions on this rule than we had on the probabilistic one. Why?
Well. the story goes as follows. Suppose that a do main expert told us that his state of belief is such that :
1. The objection to A is a. Contradictory statements of the form given above are a result of careless asses s ment. of one ·s objections. An IO'Xample will illustrate this point. We all know that having no wings is an objection to an anima l being a bird:
The objection to B after
-t»(bird) = vingless.
\Ve also know that. abnormality is an objection t.o the flying of a bird:
-t»bird (fly) = -,norm al.
Although the two statements above seem plausible. they are in fact cont.ra.di<'t . ory in the wntext of Equa t.ion 1. To Sft' this, not.P t.ha.t. Equation 1 implies -t».4(B) I= -.�(A). That. is, the given conditional ob jection must Pntail the ne g ation of the condition's ohject. ion. But abnormality does not entail having wings! The problem is that when assessing objec tions. we tend to forget the following important fact:
An invalid conditional objection should entail the negation of the objection to the condition.
This, however. can be easily remedied if whenever a domain expert provides an invalid b as the objection given A, we take that. to mean b conjoined with the negation of A's objection: b II -.-t»(A).
IRRELEVANCE
The third component of a causal net.work is a directed graph such as the one depicted in Figure l . The syntax of the graph does not depend on whether it is part of a PCN or an OCN, but its interpretation (the information it represents) does.
Informally. the directed graph of a causal network says the following: "Given a conjunction over the parents of a proposition P;, information about tbe non-descen dants of P; become irrelevant to the sup port for P;." For example. considering the net.work of Figure 1 . once we know that "The grass is wet, .. the information "It rained" does not. change the support for �My shoes are wet."
Probabilitv calculus formalizes irrelevance in terms of condition�! probability. The statement "A becomes irrelevant. to B once C is known'' is formalized as �The probability of B given C/1.4 equals the probabil it. y of B given only C." Formally. 
FROM CAUSAL NETWORKS TO STATES OF BELIEF
Irrelevance information represented hy the network of Figure 1 and the probabilities given in Table 2 con stitute a complete definit . ion of a probabilistic state of belief. This follows from a known result in the literature on causal net works (see [11] for example) .
Similar!:•. irrelevance information rf:'present.ed hy the network of Figure 1 and object .
ions given in Ta ble 3 constitute a complete definition of an objection based stat.e of belief. Proving this result is outside the scope of this paper -the int . erested reader is re ferred to [3] where the proof is given with respect . to abstract. causal networks that generalize PCNs and
OCNs. However. I will show in the remaining of this section that the above claim is true for the OCN that was developed in Figure 1 and Table 3 .
Consider the following equat ion. which is an instance of Equation 2: 
All conditional and prior objections required by the above equation are given in Table 3 . For example ,
which is also equivalent to 04 V 03 V Ot. That. is, "Either I did not step on the grass or t .
he grass is covered or it is dark'' is the objection to ''The sprin kler was off. but it rained, the grass is wet, shiny and Probabilistically. P(Ps A P� A ?3 A -.p� A P1) Pquals P(.P.�IPa) x P(P41Pa) x P(Pai-.P� 1\ Pl)x P(-.P:?) X PtPd = .1518i5.
(5}
Since any sentence about . the network of Figure 1 can be written as a disjunction of some instances of Table; ) do specify an objection-based state of belief.
DISCUSSION
Objection-based causal networks resemble proba bilistic causal networks in their structure and be havior.
In an objection-based network. a depen dency between nodes is quantified by providing log ical sentences under which the dependency does not. exist.
Objection-based causal networks enjoy al most all propert.ies that make probabilist.ic causal networks popular, with the added advantage that . ob jections are. arguably. more intuitive than probabil ities. Following are other advantages of objection based causal networks over their probabilistic coun terparts .
• Incomparable st1pports. Degrees of support in OCNs are only partially ordered while their probabilistic counterparts are totally orderf'd.
In the network of Figure 1 . probabilistic quan tificat.ion has forced us to say that. the causal de pendency from "It rained" to "The grass is wet" is weaker than the one from "The grass is Wf't'' to "Mv shoes are wet." No such commitment is enforc�d by objection-based quantification.
• Intuitiveness. Probably the major objection to PCNs is the interpretation of numbers that ar>" used in quantifying causal dependencies. For example, what doe!' it mean to say that the causal dependen cy from "The grass is wet '" 10 the strength of a causal dependency in an OCN has a very clear interpretation : it is a condi tion under which the causal dependency does not exist.
I end this discussion by observing that . objection cal culus and objection-based causal networks are closely related to clause management syst ems . which are well known in AI [1, 13] .
